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REDEFINING PARENTAL RIGHTS: THE 
CASE OF CORPORAL PUNISHMENT 
Cynthia Godsoe* 
INTRODUCTION 
Discussions of the constitutional elements of family law have 
almost exclusively focused on marriage and adult intimate 
relationships, particularly recently.1 In contrast, scholars and 
reformers alike have given parenthood short shrift.2 Yet 
parenthood, not marriage, was the first family relationship found 
to be constitutionally significant. The United States Supreme 
Court has repeatedly expressed a parent’s fundamental right to 
raise her child as she sees fit.3 This line of cases has been used to 
support significant parental choice in education, medical care, and 
other aspects of child rearing.4 Parental autonomy is in large part 
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 1. Jill Hasday has pointed out that scholars have paid less attention to family law 
than other areas of law. See Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. 
REV. 825, 828 (2004) (“Academic theorists have devoted much less attention to family law 
than they have spent on thoroughly examining legal subjects like constitutional law.”). 
Within family law, parenthood receives still less attention. I have previously examined the 
focus on marriage over parenthood in the context of same-sex marriage. See Cynthia 
Godsoe, Adopting the Gay Family, 90 TUL. L. REV. 311 (2015); Cynthia Godsoe, Perfect 
Plaintiffs, 125 YALE L.J.F. 136 (2015), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/perfect-
plaintiffs. 
 2. There are of course exceptions including, significantly, the work of Doug 
NeJaime in this symposium issue and elsewhere. See, e.g., Doug NeJaime, Before Marriage: 
The Unexplored History of Nonmarital Recognition and Its Relationship to Marriage, 
102 CAL. L. REV. 87 (2014). 
 3. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923) (holding that parents may choose 
to have their children taught a language in addition to English in school); Pierce v. Soc’y 
of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (recognizing a 
parent’s right to raise her children as she sees fit as “perhaps the oldest of the fundamental 
liberty interests”). 
 4. Parental rights in the medical care context, however, have increasingly been 
limited by state courts. See, e.g., In re Sampson, 278 N.E.2d 918, 919 (N.Y. 1972) (per 
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based on a presumption that parents’ and children’s interests 
accord, that “natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the 
best interests of their children.”5 It is also animated by the privacy 
and liberty of choice about intimate relations at the heart of 
constitutional family law.6 
In this Article, I argue that this thick conception of parental 
rights shields significant intrafamilial harms, specifically parental 
corporal punishment.7 Since Blackstone’s time, the parental 
discipline privilege has condoned parental assault on children in 
the name of discipline.8 Every state has such a privilege. Many are 
very broad, permitting any caregiver of the child to administer 
corporal punishment bringing physical injury that stops short of 
“severe bodily injury or death.”9 Parental corporal punishment 
continues to be widely practiced,10 despite the overwhelming 
 
curiam) (affirming lower court’s order of medical treatment despite the parents’ religious 
objections even though the child’s life was not in imminent danger). 
 5. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979). 
 6. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558 (2003); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2071 (2015). See also Melissa Murray, Rights 
and Regulation: The Evolution of Sexual Regulation, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 577 (2016). 
 7. I adopt the widely accepted sociological definition of corporal punishment to 
mean any physical punishment, including spanking with or without objects, such as belts. 
See, e.g., Benjamin Shmueli, Corporal Punishment in the Educational System Versus 
Corporal Punishment by Parents: A Comparative View, 73 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 281, 282 
(2010) (outlining definitions). 
 8. I use here the terminology employed in most states, the parental discipline 
privilege, to mean exemption of certain adults from criminal liability for acts that would 
otherwise be assault or battery. As noted below, this usually takes the form of an 
affirmative defense. 
 9. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08(1) (A.L.I. 2015). 
 10. Most states codify this by statute; a few do so by judicial decision. Studies show 
that almost half of parents have corporally punished their children, with rates ranging from 
77 percent to 13 percent depending upon the child’s age and sex. Murray A. Straus, 
Prevalence, Societal Causes, and Trends in Corporal Punishment and Parents in World 
Perspective, 3 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 1, 3–6 (2010). A majority of Americans 
continue to support parental corporal punishment. Id. at 15–16. This view is declining, 
however, from over 90 percent in 1968 to 65–70 percent in 2005. See Stephanie Hanes, To 
Spank or Not to Spank, Corporal Punishment in the U.S., CS MONITOR (Oct. 19, 2014), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Society/2014/1019/To-spank-or-not-to-spank-Corporal-
punishment-in-the-US (reporting on the research of Straus and other experts). See also 
Child Trends Databank, Attitudes Towards Spanking: Indicators of Child and Youth Well-
Being 3 (Figure 1) (Nov. 2015) https://www.childtrends.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11
/51_Attitudes_Toward_Spanking.pdf (compiling GSS data to conclude that “[b]etween 
1986 and 2014, the proportion of women who agreed or strongly agreed that it is sometimes 
necessary to give a child a ‘good, hard spanking’ dropped by 22 percent (from 82 to 65 
percent). While approval among men dropped seven percent between 1986 and 1991 (from 
84 to 78 percent), it has since remained steady, and was at 76 percent in 2014.”). This 
number has remained roughly consistent to date, although there are significant variations 
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research demonstrating that it is ineffective at discipline and has 
significant negative effects on children’s behavior and 
socialization.11 These include a greater propensity for future 
violence, and increased risk of mental health and cognitive 
outcomes.12 These empirically proven harms are coupled with 
injuries to personhood that perpetuate hierarchies along 
gendered and racialized lines. Indeed, one expert recently argued 
that corporal punishment, which is disproportionately high in 
Black families, is a vestige of slavery that continues to operate to 
subjugate and traumatize Black children and youth.13 
No rationale supports this forgiveness of significant harm to 
society’s most vulnerable members. A majority of states are silent 
as to the rationale. Although the Court has never enumerated 
corporal punishment as a parental right, a number of state and 
federal courts have found it to be within a parent’s childrearing 
prerogative.14 The main justifications commentators and judges 
give include tradition and personal beliefs about childrearing. 
One court recently acquitted a father for choking his teenaged 
daughter, emphasizing her “strong belief” that juveniles should be 
subject to physical discipline, and demonstrating willful blindness 
to the research and documented injuries in that case.15 Another 
recent decision relied heavily on a pre-Civil War case to reverse 
 
by region, gender, race, and religion. See, e.g., Cathaleen Chen, Can You Spank Kids And 
Be Foster Parent? Mass. High Court Says No, CHR. SCI. MONITOR (Jan. 8, 2016) (using 
GSS data). Finally, approval ratings vary significantly depending upon the terminology 
used in describing it. See Chloe Kerr, Mind Your Language, THE SUN (Jan. 6, 2017), 
https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/2547037/word-spank-should-be-replaced-with-assault-
because-it-legitimises-violence-against-children-say-psychologists (reporting research that 
people’s approval of corporal punishment decreases significantly when the words hit, beat, 
etc., are used instead of “spank”).  
 11. See discussion infra notes 69–72. 
 12. See infra notes 70–74. 
 13. See Stacey Patton, Stop Beating Black Children, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2017), 
available at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/10/opinion/sunday/stop-beating-black-child
ren.html (discussing her book SPARE THE KIDS: WHY WHUPPING CHILDREN WON’T 
SAVE BLACK AMERICA (2017)). 
 14. Compare Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 523 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he [] parents’ liberty 
interest in directing the upbringing and education of their children includes the right to 
discipline them by using reasonable, nonexcessive corporal punishment, and to delegate 
that parental authority to private school officials.”), with Sweaney v. Ada County, 119 F.3d 
1385, 1389 (1997) (concluding that the Meyer line of cases does not give parents the right 
to “strike a child with a belt without being” investigated and potentially prosecuted). 
 15. Carter v. Indiana, 67 N.E.3d 1041 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). 
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the conviction of a father who severely beat his son with a paddle 
after the boy refused to eat his dinner.16  
Attempts to cabin parental corporal punishment via a mens 
rea of truly disciplinary purpose or the like have not sufficiently 
limited it. Instead, the expert consensus against it, and the threats 
and cursing that often accompany it, reveal that parental corporal 
punishment is at best a very misinformed attempt at discipline and 
at worst a use of children as literal “whipping posts” for 
frustration and rage.17 Accordingly, I argue that the parental 
discipline privilege should be abolished as have all other 
categorical status exceptions to a violent crime.18 
Parental corporal punishment has been surprisingly ignored 
in legal scholarship and policy reform. High-profile cases, such as 
the recent prosecution of NFL star Adrian Peterson for 
disciplining his five-year-old son with a tree branch, have 
prompted significant discussion in the media and popular 
forums.19 Social scientists have written extensively about the 
harms of corporal punishments and recommended changed 
terminology and other reforms.20 Advocates have succeeded in 
banning corporal punishment in almost all other settings including 
daycares and most schools. Yet scholars and reformers have failed 
to examine the parental discipline privilege, despite its anomalous 
nature. 21 
 
 16. See infra note 66 (discussing a 2017 North Carolina Court of Appeals decision). 
 17. For instance, the father in the case described in note 16 was cursing and screaming 
at his son as he whipped him. 
 18. Other historic status exceptions, such as the ‘discipline’ of wives and apprentices 
have long been abolished and crimes against these parties criminalized. See, e.g., Elizabeth 
M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973 (1991). 
 19. For just two examples, see Susan Perry, Adrian Peterson Case Brings Corporal 
Punishment Back into the Spotlight, MINNPOST (Sept. 17, 2014), https://www.minnpost.
com/second-opinion/2014/09/adrian-peterson-case-brings-corporal-punishment-back-
spotlight; Anthony Zurcher, Adrian Peterson: Parenting, Punishment and Race, BBC 
NEWS (Sept. 15, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-echochambers-29186080. 
 20. Elizabeth T. Gershoff & Andrew Grogan-Kaylor, Spanking and Child Outcomes: 
Old Controversies and New Meta-Analyses, 30 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 13 (2016). See also infra 
notes 69-72. Scholars from other fields are also beginning to examine corporal punishment. 
For instance, a scholar of African-American history recently published a book on corporal 
punishment in the Black community. See Patton, supra note 13. 
 21. The scant treatment of corporal punishment by legal scholars approaches it from 
a children’s rights perspective. See, e.g., Deanna A. Pollard, Banning Corporal Punishment: 
A Constitutional Analysis, 52 AM. U.L. REV. 447 (2003). This analysis is consonant with 
mine, but fails to fully consider the parental rights justification for corporal punishment. 
But see James G. Dwyer, Parental Entitlement and Corporal Punishment, 73 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 189 (2010). Dwyer does distinguish parental rights in this context from 
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This is a particularly propitious time for an examination of 
the parental discipline privilege. The constitutional analysis of 
family status and privacy in the context of marriage and adult 
intimacy has changed significantly in recent years to recognize 
new equality norms.22 The constitutional analysis of parenthood 
should similarly adapt to new empirical data and evolving social 
norms against the exculpation of intrafamilial harms. I argue that 
the forgiveness of parental corporal punishment is not just bad 
policy, but is also an overreading of the parental rights 
jurisprudence. Parental rights are not infinite; the state parens 
patriae duty to protect children is a significant limitation on 
parental choice. Indeed, state and children’s interests render 
parental rights more flexible and context-specific than other 
family constitutional rights.23 Abolishing the parental discipline 
privilege is consistent both with this framework and a more 
inclusive reading of family privacy.24 
I begin this Article by delineating the constitutional 
framework of parental rights to raise children, highlighting the 
soft nature of these rights and their inextricable connection with 
a duty of care. In Part II, I chart the breadth of the parental 
discipline privilege exculpating parental assaults on children. 
None of the rationales for this ongoing status exculpation are 
sufficient in light of the social science literature on corporal 
punishment’s extensive harms. Turning to the normative, I argue 
in Part III that evolving standards of child rearing, and the flexible 
nature of parental rights, militate towards abolishing the parental 
discipline privilege. The conclusion flags lessons this examination 
of the parental discipline privilege has for other parental decisions 
and conduct. 
I. SOFT PARENTAL RIGHTS 
Parental rights were the first family privacy rights to be 
expressly defined. In a line of cases concerning a parent’s right to 
 
the core examples of education and medical care. Nonetheless, he stops short of arguing 
that parental rights do not support corporal punishment. 
 22. Several examples include same-sex marriage, as well as the criminalization of 
intimate partner violence and marital rape. See Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A 
Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1373, 1406 (2000); Schneider, supra note 
18, at 976; Cynthia Godsoe, Redrawing the Boundaries of Relational Crime, 68 ALA. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2017); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2071 (2015). 
 23. See discussion infra Part I. 
 24. See infra notes 115-118. 
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choose their children’s education, the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly confirmed that “[the] primary role of parents in the 
upbringing of their children is . . . an enduring American 
tradition.”25 Recently, the Court  again emphasized a broad swath 
of parental discretion, holding that parents may decide who may 
visit their children, including barring other relatives from doing 
so.26 Parental rights are based on family privacy, the recognition 
of a diversity of families, and the parental ability to best care for 
and nurture future citizens.27 The last rationale—the presumption 
that parents act with their children’s best interests in mind—is 
particularly important.28 As the Court has stated, a parent’s 
“natural bonds of affection lead [her] to act in the best interests 
of [her] children.”29 Even the early cases remain salient today; 
Meyer v. Nebraska was cited in Obergefell v. Hodges to support a 
right to same-sex marriage.30 Parental control is much stronger in 
the American legal canon than in other Western countries, a 
prerogative that I and other scholars have critiqued.31 
Despite the rhetoric infusing the parental rights opinions, 
however, parental rights are more limited than other privacy-
based fundamental rights. Tellingly, the Court has declined to 
apply strict scrutiny to state regulation of parental rights, arguably 
rendering these rights quasi-fundamental, if that.32 In Troxel v. 
 
 25. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232; see also Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401 (holding that parents may 
choose to have their children taught a language in addition to English in school); Pierce, 
268 U.S. at 535; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 205. 
 26. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65 (recognizing a parent’s right to raise her children as she 
sees fit as “perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests”). 
 27. Id. 
 28. The presumption is not, however, absolute. Rather, the Court has cautioned that 
“experience and reality may rebut what the law accepts as a starting point.” Parham, 442 
U.S. at 602. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 14–15. 
 31. Cynthia Godsoe, Parsing Parenthood, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 113 (2013); 
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns The Child?”: Meyer and Pierce and the Child 
as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 997 (1992) (arguing that the right of parental 
control, although termed a liberty interest, seems to posit children as parental property). 
 32. In Troxel, the Court articulated a presumption in favor of a fit parent’s choices 
rather than a strict scrutiny standard. Shulman further points out that the plurality opinion 
in Troxel uses the term fundamental rights numerous times, but does not address the claim 
at issue as a true fundamental right. See JEFFREY SHULMAN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
PARENT: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND THE ENFRANCHISEMENT OF THE CHILD 126–
27 (2014); see also Jeffrey Shulman, Does the Constitution Protect A Fundamental Right to 
Parent?, CONST. DAILY (July 8, 2014), http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2014/07/does-the-
constitution-protect-a-fundamental-right-to-parent (“The Supreme Court has echoed the 
popular assumption that the right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, 
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Granville, its most recent opinion, the Court outlined a 
presumption that a fit parent’s choices cannot be second-guessed 
by the state—significantly less than a fully protected right. It also 
explicitly limited the strongest case of parental rights, Wisconsin 
v. Yoder, to its unusual facts, involving the insular and self-reliant 
Amish community.33 Indeed, courts have clarified that harm is not 
required for intervention into the parent-child relationship; in 
contrast, the state may “reasonably” regulate children’s 
education, health, and general care.34 Even the early cases 
described parental liberty both as a right and an obligation, “the 
right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare [a 
child] for [his] additional obligations.”35 
Parental rights are further limited by the state’s parens 
patriae duty to protect children. In Prince v. Massachusetts, the 
Court limited parental discretion. Proclaiming that the “state has 
a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority 
in things affecting the child’s welfare,” the Court upheld a child 
labor law prohibiting a Jehovah’s Witness from taking her ten-
year-old ward to proselytize with her on the street.36 Protection is 
necessary not only for the child’s sake but also for society’s, given 
its need for “the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people 
into full maturity as citizens[.]”37 
Several prescient scholars have highlighted the “tenuous” 
and relative nature of parental rights.38 In a recent history of the 
parental rights cases, Jeffrey Shulman demonstrates that, contrary 
 
custody, and nurture of their children is a deeply rooted one . . . . But no Supreme Court 
case has held that the right of parents to make such choices is a fundamental one.”). Several 
state courts, however, have applied strict scrutiny, at least as to the rights of “fit parents” 
(a somewhat circular inquiry). See, e.g., In re Custody of BMH, 315 P.3d 470, 487 (Wash. 
2013). 
 33. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232 (predicting that “few other religious groups or sects” could 
make the necessary showing). Shulman aptly describes this case as “idiosyncratic . . . [i]ts 
reasoning is a strange brew of romantic projection and conscious self-deception, something 
akin to infatuation [with the Amish way of life] from a court old enough to know better.” 
SHULMAN, supra note 32, at 110. 
 34. The Court also notes the lack of harm in cases upholding parental rights. See, e.g., 
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 230 (finding no evidence of “any harm to the physical or mental health 
of the child or to the public safety, peace, order, or welfare”). 
 35. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535. 
 36. Prince, 321 U.S. at 167. 
 37. Id. at 168. 
 38. SHULMAN, supra note 32, at 8; see also SHAWN FRANCIS PETERS, THE YODER 
CASE: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, EDUCATION, AND PARENTAL RIGHTS 175 (2003) (noting 
that Yoder’s “constitutional legacy did not prove to be especially durable”). 
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to popular belief, parental rights have always been limited in the 
name of societal interests and enlightened childrearing. He quotes 
nineteenth-century Justice Joseph Story critiquing absolute 
parental rights as uncivilized and opining that the state has the 
power “to control the conduct of the [parent] in the education of 
his children.”39 Similarly, constitutional scholar David Meyer 
concludes that modern jurisprudence establishes parental rights 
as “essentially soft” and merely presumptive based on the need to 
accommodate societal and children’s interests.40 
As noted above, the Court has never considered whether 
parental control includes a parental right to corporal punishment. 
Most statutes which codify the parental discipline privilege 
likewise never explicitly mention parental rights.41 Lower courts 
considering the issue have gone both ways, but the majority have 
found a narrow right to parental corporal punishment. For 
instance, the Supreme Judicial Court in Massachusetts recently 
reversed a parent’s assault and battery conviction for briefly 
spanking a three-year-old with his hand.42 The Court noted the 
delicate balance “between protecting children from punishment 
that is excessive in nature, while at the same time permitting 
parents to use limited physical force in disciplining their children 
without incurring criminal sanction.”43 Similarly, several other 
state and federal courts have expressed a parent’s right to use 
“reasonable” corporal punishment.44 Others, however, have 
 
 39. Id. at 3. 
 40. DAVID D. MEYER, FAMILY DIVERSITY AND THE RIGHTS OF PARENTHOOD, in 
WHAT IS PARENTHOOD?: CONTEMPORARY DEBATES ABOUT THE FAMILY 124 (Linda C. 
McClain & Daniel Cere eds., 2013). As discussed further below, scholars have posited a 
trustee rather than ownership-based notion of constitutional parenthood, consistent with 
the soft nature of parental rights. 
 41. Indeed, almost half the states do not specify any rationale for the parental 
discipline privilege. Several state laws, however, arguably imply parental rights in legally 
authorizing reasonable parental corporal punishment. See, e.g., AS. STAT. § 11.81.430 
(prescribing that parent or person in loco parentis has the “authority” to discipline). 
 42. Commonwealth v. Dorvil, 32 N.E.3d 861, 861 (Mass. 2015). 
 43. Id. at 868. 
 44. See, e.g., Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 523 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he [] parents’ liberty 
interest in directing the upbringing and education of their children includes the right to 
discipline them by using reasonable, nonexcessive corporal punishment, and to delegate 
that parental authority to private school officials.”); State v. Wilder, 748 A.2d 444, 449 (Me. 
2000) (holding that a parent has the fundamental right to “use [] reasonable or moderate 
force to control behavior” and this finds expression in the parental discipline privilege 
codified in Maine law); State v. Rosa, 6 N.E.3d 57, 59 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013) (noting “a 
parent’s fundamental constitutional right to child-rearing, which includes a right to impose 
reasonable discipline, including the use of corporal punishment”). 
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concluded that striking a child with a belt is not protected under 
the parental privilege.45 
Those courts recognizing a constitutional element to the 
parental discipline privilege rely both on parents’ rights cases and 
on a more general right to family privacy.46 These courts, however, 
clarify that this activity is limited; as one bluntly put it: “child 
abuse is not constitutionally protected activity.”47 Courts have 
also been careful to note the competing interests of family 
autonomy and child protection—a balancing that is much less 
explicit in the Supreme Court parental rights cases involving 
education. For instance, one federal court cautioned that corporal 
punishment cases raise “an inherent tension between the privacy 
and sanctity of the family, including the freedom to raise children 
as parents see fit, and the interest of the state in the safety and 
well-being of children.”48 Similarly, the Massachusetts high court 
noted its “deep mindful[ness] of the dual important interests 
implicated in the defense: the welfare of children requiring 
protection against abuse, on the one hand, and, on the other, the 
avoidance of unnecessary State interference in parental 
autonomy as it concerns child rearing.”49 These courts’ depiction 
of parental rights is not robust. Indeed, all of these opinions focus 
considerably more on tradition and practicality than parental 
rights, rationales I argue below are not legitimate grounds for 
forgiving assault and battery.50 
 
 45. See Sweaney, 119 F.3d at 1389 (concluding that the Meyer line of cases does not 
give parents the right to “strike a child with a belt without being” investigated and 
potentially prosecuted). 
 46. See, e.g., State v. Sinica, 372 N.W.2d 445, 447 (Neb. 1985) (citing cases including 
Griswold, Meyer, Pierce). In a number of these cases, the parents hit their children in a 
public place. For instance, the mother in Sweaney hit her child at school in front of 
teachers. See Sweaney, 119 F.3d at 1387. The father in Dorvil spanked and allegedly kicked 
his child on the street, witnessed by two police officers. See 32 N.E.3d at 864. As discussed 
further below—see infra notes 104-108—some courts seem to consider this significant in 
adjudicating the permissibility of the punishment, although I argue this distinction is not 
relevant. 
 47. Sinica, 372 N.W.2d at 449 (articulating rights to familial privacy and parental 
choices in child-rearing). 
 48. United States v. Rivera, 54 M.J. 489, 491 (C.A.A.F 2001). 
 49. Dorvil, 32 N.E.3d at 863. Shortly after its decision in Dorvil, the Massachusetts 
high court forbade foster parents from engaging in corporal punishment. See Magazu v. 
Dep’t of Children & Families, 42 N.E.3d 1107 (Mass. 2016). 
 50. Dorvil, 32 N.E.3d at 866–67 (discussing history). 
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II. THE PARENTAL DISCIPLINE PRIVILEGE 
This Part charts the broad scope of the parental discipline 
privilege—a scope not supported by contemporary readings of 
parental rights. It then turns to the harms of this exception to 
criminal assault law, detailing the overwhelming research 
consensus that even mild corporal punishment brings a risk of 
significant developmental consequences. It concludes by 
documenting the growing domestic consensus which have led to 
the abolition of corporal punishment in other settings and, 
internationally, even in the home. 
A. PARENTAL DISCIPLINE PRIVILEGE 
Every state grants parents the right to physically punish their 
children with no criminal liability for assault and battery. Most 
jurisdictions have codified the parental discipline privilege either 
as an affirmative defense to prosecution or as part of the statutory 
definition of child abuse; others have recognized the privilege 
judicially.51 It is framed as a justification, not an excuse, meaning 
that the conduct itself is deemed innocent.52 The parental 
discipline privilege is the only remaining status-based exculpation 
for assault; others such as intimate partner violence and the 
beating of apprentices and students, have long been abolished. 
Accordingly, as Jill Hasday points out, the parental discipline 
privilege contradicts the family law “progress narrative” that 
children’s wellbeing has been increasingly protected.53 
 
 51. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.10(1) (McKinneys 2015) (“The use of physical 
force upon another person which would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable and 
not criminal [when] . . . 1. A parent, guardian or other person entrusted with the care and 
supervision of a person under the age of twenty-one . . . may use physical force, but not 
deadly physical force, upon such person when and to the extent that he reasonably believes 
it necessary to maintain discipline or to promote the welfare of such person.”); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS § 750.136b(9) (2015) (“This section does not prohibit a parent or guardian, 
or other person permitted by law or authorized by the parent or guardian, from taking 
steps to reasonably discipline a child, including the use of reasonable force.”); 11 R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 11-9-5.3(d) (2015) (“For the purpose of this section, ‘other physical injury’ is 
defined as any injury, other than a serious bodily injury, which arises other than from the 
imposition of nonexcessive corporal punishment.”). 
 52. See, e.g., ALASKA PENAL CODE 11.81.430 (2016); WIS. STAT. § 939.45(5) (2017); 
Dorvil, 32 N.E.3d at 870. 
 53. JILL ELAINE HASDAY, FAMILY LAW REIMAGINED 133–35, 147–48 (2014) 
(theorizing that “stories about the triumph of children’s best interests can divert attention 
from examining how family law actually regulates the parent-child relationship and from 
considering the normative question. . . Where should family law prioritize parental 
prerogatives, and where, how, and to what extent does family law’s continued deference 
to parental rights over children’s interests need to be reformed?”). 
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The privilege historically attached only to fathers, but has 
since been extended to all legal parents and guardians.54 Most 
states also allow custodians or persons acting as a parent to assert 
the privilege.55 Accordingly, it has a very broad scope; a significant 
number of people without a legal relationship to a child, such as a 
mother’s boyfriend, are permitted to corporally punish that child 
with no criminal liability.56 
All states forgive parental assault that brings some harm, 
allowing, for instance, corporal punishment on even very young 
children and condoning hitting them with objects, such as a 
wooden spoon or leather belt.57 Accordingly, the scope of 
permissible physical punishment goes well beyond the oft-raised 
example of a parent grabbing a toddler to keep her from running 
into the street. Every state permits some physical harm and non-
severe mental or emotional injury.58 Numerous states, and the 
 
 54. The Massachusetts Stubborn Child Statute permitted fathers to kill misbehaving 
children. Some states still limit it to these categories. LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:18 (2015) (“This 
defense of justification can be claimed . . . . (4) When the offender’s conduct is reasonable 
discipline of minors by their parents . . . .”); WIS. STAT. § 939.45(5)(a)(3), (5)(b) (2017) 
(stating the defense of privilege can be claimed “[w]hen the actor’s conduct is reasonable 
discipline of a child by a person responsible for the child’s welfare” and explaining 
“‘[p]erson responsible for the child’s welfare’ includes the child’s parent, stepparent, or 
guardian”). 
 55. Forty states allow custodians to assert the privilege, thirty-four go even further, 
allowing adults in loco parentis to do so. See, e.g., O.R.C. § 2151.031(C) (2015) (defining 
child abuse but excluding “a child exhibiting evidence of corporal punishment or other 
physical disciplinary measure by a parent, guardian, custodian, person having custody or 
control, or person in loco parentis” if the discipline satisfies the standard codified 
elsewhere); J.C. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 773 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) 
(finding that an 11-year-old child was not abused when the stepfather, acting in loco 
parentis, used a belt to spank the child on the buttocks, which produced bruising). 
 56. The extremely broad, functional definition in the corporal punishment context 
stands in sharp contrast to other definitions of parents in the criminal and family law. See 
Godsoe, Relational Crime, supra note 22. I note this primarily to emphasize the sweep of 
the harm of corporal punishment, since many cases involve non-parents whose physical 
discipline is excused under the parental discipline privilege. 
 57. In determining the reasonableness of punishment, courts look at a variety of 
factors including the child’s age, gender, the form, amount, and bodily location of the 
hitting, and the “totality of the circumstances.” See, e.g., Dorvil, 32 N.E.3d at 870. 
 58. See, e.g., HI REV. STAT. § 703-309 (2011) (“The force used [must] not 
intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently create a risk of causing substantial 
bodily injury, disfigurement, extreme pain or mental distress, or neurological damage.”). 
Some statutes attempt to limit harm inflicted by providing categorical exclusions of certain 
children (i.e., below a certain age such as “nonaccidental injury to a child under the age of 
18 months” or “shaking a minor under three years of age”) or particular types of acts (e.g., 
throwing, kicking, burning, biting, cutting, striking with a closed fist, interfering with 
breathing, or threatening with a deadly weapon) from the parental privilege. D.C. CODE § 
16-2301 (2016); 11 DEL. CODE § 468 (2016); HI REV. STAT. § 703-309 (2011); RCW § 
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Model Penal Code, go quite a bit further, and explicitly permit a 
wide swath of parental discipline as long as it does not risk “severe 
bodily injury or death.”59 Corporal punishment is still widely 
practiced, with over half of American adults engaging in it.60 
Parents in the South, fundamentalist Christian parents and Black 
parents are significantly more likely to use physical discipline.61 
The most common rationales offered for the parental 
discipline privilege are historic or personal, neither of which 
justifies the broad exculpation of assault against children.62 The 
reliance on tradition rather than empirics or deliberate policy is 
evident in the fact that about half of states do not cite any 
rationale for this anachronistic exemption, while those that do cite 
 
9A.16.100 (2012) (prescribing that harm must not be “greater than transient pain or minor 
temporary marks”). 
 59. Parental privilege applies when “(a) the force is used for the purpose of 
safeguarding or promoting the welfare of the minor, including the prevention or 
punishment of his misconduct; and (b) the force used is not designed to cause or known to 
create a substantial risk of causing death, serious bodily injury, disfigurement, extreme 
pain or mental distress or gross degradation.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08(1) (A.L.I. 
2015). This standard does not require that the force be reasonable or that the parent 
reasonably believes the use of force is appropriate. See id. § 3.08 cmt. 2. 
 60. See Straus, supra note 10, at 3–6. Rates are particularly high among babies and 
toddlers. See Elizabeth T. Gershoff & Susan H. Bitensky, The Case Against Corporal 
Punishment of Children: Converging Evidence From Social Science Research and 
International Human Rights Law and Implications for U.S. Public Policy, 13 PSYCHOL., 
PUB. POL’Y & L. 231, 232 (2007). As to public opinion, see Steve Hendrix, The End of 
Spanking?, WASH. POST MAG. (Jan. 3, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle
/magazine/the-end-of-spanking/2013/01/02/d328cf1e-3273-11e2-bb9b-288a310849ee_story
.html (reporting that 65 to 75 percent of people believe that “it is okay to occasionally 
spank a child”). In recent years, support for corporal punishment has declined modestly. 
Attitudes Towards Spanking, CHILDTRENDS.ORG (2015), http://www.childtrends.org
/indicators/attitudes-toward-spanking (using biannual GSS data). 
 61. This was the topic of one episode of the popular television show black-ish. See 
James Poniewozik, black-ish Whips Up a Conversation About Spanking, TIME (Oct. 23, 
2014), http://time.com/3534219/review-blackish-spanking; see also Harry Enten, 
Americans’ Opinions on Spanking Vary By Party, Race, Region and Religion, 
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Sept. 15, 2014, 4:49 PM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/datalab/american
s-opinions-on-spanking-vary-by-party-race-region-and-religion/ (using data from 1986-
2010 to demonstrate the “large gaps” in opinion between evangelical Christians and other 
Americans, reporting that African-Americans are 11 percent more likely to support 
corporal punishment than whites including Hispanics, and showing that people in the 
South are 17 percent more likely to support spanking than those in the Northeast). 
 62. See Godsoe, Relational Crime, supra note 22; see also Dwyer, supra note 21, at 
192 (noting that “parental-entitlement claim[s], although once common and certainly 
sometimes still expressed, [are] not especially prominent in debates concerning corporal 
punishment today”). 
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a rationale usually do so in vague and conclusory terms.63 Courts 
continue to cite Blackstone’s centuries-old statement of a parent’s 
power to “lawfully correct his child. . . in a reasonable manner; for 
. . . the benefit of his education.”64 These historic rationales are 
sometimes coupled with religious justifications. “Spare the rod 
and spoil the child” remains a frequently, if incorrectly, cited 
Biblical passage and, tellingly, fundamentalist Christians are 
significantly more likely than other Americans to support and use 
corporal punishment.65 
One recent case before the North Carolina Supreme Court 
demonstrates the problems with depending on tradition alone to 
demarcate the boundaries of the privilege. Dean Michael Varner, 
angered by his ten-year-old son’s “picky eating,” beat him with a 
paddle on his legs and feet. He cursed and yelled at the child while 
doing so, and the assault resulted in “bruising from [the boy’s] 
knee to his waist,” pain and several days of impaired walking. The 
jury acquitted Varner of felony child abuse, but convicted him of 
a misdemeanor. In reversing Varner’s conviction and granting 
him a new trial, the appellate court relied heavily on a 180-year-
old case. That case outlined the “sacred duties of parents to train 
up and qualify their children, for becoming useful and virtuous 
members of society. . . to command obedience, to control 
stubbornness, . . . and to reform bad habits.”66 Reliance on a 
precedent from a time when slavery, marital rape, and the 
physical punishment of apprentices were still allowed permits a 
 
 63.  See Walter E. Williams, Making a Case for Corporal Punishment, INSIGHT ON 
THE NEWS (Sept. 13, 1999), https://www.questia.com/magazine/1G1-55821653/making-a-
case-for-corporal-punishment. 
 64.  1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *440; see also 3 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *120 (positing parental discipline as an exception to 
battery: “battery is, in some cases, justifiable or lawful; as where one who hath authority, 
a parent or master, gives moderate correction to his child, his scholar, or his apprentice.”). 
 65. See MURRAY A. STRAUS & DENISE A. DONNELLY, BEATING THE DEVIL OUT 
OF THEM: CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN FAMILIES AND ITS EFFECTS ON 
CHILDREN 183–84 (1994) (detailing the relationship between religion and corporal 
punishment and noting that this passage refers to a shepherd guiding or redirecting his 
flock of sheep, not striking them); see also Magazu, 473 Mass. at 431 (arguing that because 
physical discipline is an integral aspect of their Christian faith, the department’s decision 
to deny their license as foster parents impermissibly infringes on their constitutional right 
to the free exercise of religion). 
 66. The Sanford Herald, Guest Editorial: N.C. Spanking Case Raises Questions on 
Parental Rights, WILSON TIMES (March 19, 2017, 7:50 PM), available at http://www.wilson
times.com/stories/guest-editorial-nc-spanking-case-raises-questions-on-parental-rights,82
322. 
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distortion of the parental role and obscures the significant harms 
of corporal punishment. 
In support of corporal punishment, commentators frequently 
cite their own experiences growing up or their beliefs about child 
rearing, even though they are contradicted by all the child 
development research. Typical is this advocate, arguing that 
“[r]egardless of what the experts preach, the undeniable fact is the 
‘uncivilized’ practice of whipping children produced more 
civilized young people. . .”67 Another explicitly disregards the 
empirical data: “While some studies have shown the negative 
effects of spanking, today’s disrespectful youth have shown what 
happens when necessary spanking is forgone. . . Some kids need 
it, period. When time-out, talking and taking away toys doesn’t 
work, you have to get that butt.”68 Adherents range from parents 
who want to instill fear in children for obedience,69 to others who 
are concerned that their children are already at a disadvantage, as 
with African-American boys, and thus need to be firmly, i.e. 
physically, disciplined at home or they will suffer in society.70 
This sentiment has even been expressed by courts. One trial 
court judge expressed a lot of sympathy for a father who had 
choked and used a belt to beat his teenaged daughter for 
disobeying him and texting photographs of herself wearing her 
underwear to friends: 
[N]ot only do I believe that you um, had cause[] to discipline 
her, I do. I also strongly believe that—that kids should be 
subject to discipline punishment under certain circumstances, I 
do. I have boys myself. If I had a girl who was posing half 
necked [sic] on social media, I would also be wearing orange 
[in jail] because you would not be able to hold me back from 
her. So, I totally understand why you were as angry as you 
 
 67. Williams, supra note 63. 
 68. See L. Nicole Williams, 8 Reasons to Spank Your Kids, MADAMENOIRE (Feb. 8, 
2011), http://madamenoire.com/40373/8-reasons-to-spank-your-kids. 
 69. See id. (“To be feared (in the sense of reverence) is to be respected. Your children 
should be weary [sic] of going against your rules. It also teaches them to submit to authority 
regardless of whether or not they agree.”). 
 70. See Bill Briggs, Adrian Peterson Case: Some Parents Say Spankings Improved 
Them, NBC NEWS (Sept. 19, 2014, 12:18 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/nfl-
controversy/adrian-peterson-case-some-parents-say-spankings-improved-them-n206516; 
Patton, supra note 13 (“Today, black parents are still about twice as likely as white and 
Latino families to use corporal punishment on their children. I’ve heard many black people 
attribute their successes, or the fact that they weren’t in jail, on drugs or dead, to the 
beatings they received as children.”). 
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were, and why you did what you did. Because I’m assuming you 
were trying to prevent her from living a life you don’t want her 
to live. Which is, getting pregnant at a young age, dropping out 
of school, getting her[]self physical[ly] assaulted, things like 
that. I assumed why you did what you did. Um, unfortunately, 
I think we’re in this universe now, where parents don’t just get 
to do whatever they want.71 
Not surprisingly in light of this discourse, the judge acquitted the 
father on the most serious charges.  
 Courts look at whether the parent reasonably believed that 
physical discipline was necessary or appropriate.72 In this way, the 
mens rea of the discipline privilege incorporates the parental role. 
The mens rea analysis often explicitly assesses the reason for the 
discipline, such as what type of misbehavior the child engaged in 
and how serious it was, as well as the related questions of the 
parent’s frequency of corporal punishment, and other disciplinary 
methods he or she has tried. Others examine whether the 
punishment “safeguarded” or “promoted” the child’s welfare.73 
The reasonableness requirement built into these tests 
demonstrates that parental discipline must comport with some 
standards of efficacy. Problematically, however, the parental 
mens rea transforms corporal punishment from assault to parental 
care; demonstrating this, one court distinguished physical 
violence from “disciplinary spankings” to reverse a finding of 
child abuse against the child’s mother.74 
 
 71. Carter v. Indiana, 67 N.E.3d 1041 (emphasis added). 
 72. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. § 627:6 (2016) (“[W]hen and to the extent that he [or 
she] reasonably believes it necessary to prevent or punish such minor’s misconduct . . . .”). 
 73. See, e.g., 11 DEL. CODE § 468 (2016) (allowing for two justifications, either when 
the “force is used for the purpose of safeguarding or promoting the welfare of the child” 
or when the “force used is intended to benefit the child”); see also ALASKA PENAL CODE 
§ 11.81.430 (2016) (“[T]o promote the welfare of the child . . . .”); ARKANSAS CODE § 5-2-
605 (2010) (“[T]o promote the welfare of the minor . . . .”); C.R.S. § 18-1-703 (2009); 
C.G.S.A. § 53a-18 (2011) (“[T]o promote the welfare of such minor . . . .”); KRS § 503.110 
(“[T]o promote the welfare of a minor . . . .”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1413 (1975) (“[F]or 
the purpose of safeguarding or promoting the welfare of the minor . . . .”); N.D.C.C. § 12.1-
05-05 (2013) (“[F]or the purpose of safeguarding or promoting the minor’s welfare, 
including prevention and punishment of the minor’s misconduct, and the maintenance of 
proper discipline . . . .”); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.10 (McKinney’s 2015) (“[T]o promote the 
welfare . . . .”); O.R.S. § 161.205 (2015) (“[T]o promote the welfare of the minor . . . .”); 18 
PA. C.S.A. § 509 (1992) (“[T]he force is used for the purpose of safeguarding or promoting 
the welfare of the minor . . . .”); V.A.M.S. 563.061 (1978) (“[T]o promote the welfare of a 
minor . . . .”). 
 74. Gonzalez v. Santa Clara County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 223 Cal.App.4th 72 (6th 
Cir. 2014). 
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B. HARMS OF CORPORAL PUNISHMENT 
Medical and psychological expertise almost unanimously 
confirm that corporal punishment, even moderate, is not effective 
at teaching children and is in fact harmful.75 In addition to physical 
injury, corporal punishment is correlated with increased risk of 
thirteen detrimental mental health, behavioral, and cognitive 
outcomes.76 As a result, professional organizations such as the 
American Academy of Pediatrics have issued strong statements 
against its use.77 Significantly, experts have found a correlation 
between corporal punishment and more serious parental violence 
against children.78 The difficulty in delineating between 
appropriate, non-harmful corporal punishment and abuse is 
especially problematic, leading one court to recently conclude 
that: “The [state interest in protecting children] is particularly 
powerful in the context of corporal punishment, given the risk 
that the parental privilege defense will be used as a cover for 
instances of child abuse.”79 
These empirical harms are coupled with more intangible 
harms to personhood. Being beaten, particularly by someone 
entrusted to care for you, is humiliating. Society’s condoning of 
this assault conveys problematic lessons about obedience, power, 
and physical force. It is not surprising that children who are 
physically disciplined are significantly more likely to be violent 
with their spouses or their own children as adults.80 Indeed, the 
entrenched hierarchy of parental corporal punishment is so 
problematic that one scholar recently analogized it to slavery. 
Stacey Patton also opines that slavery likely contributed to its 
ongoing disproportionate use in Black families. In a “kick the 
dog” fashion, adult slaves “who endured the trauma of their own 
 
 75. See Elizabeth T. Gershoff & Susan H. Bitensky, The Case Against Corporal 
Punishment of Children, 13 PSYCH., PUB. POL’Y & L. 231, 238–41 (2007) (cataloguing 
research on the harms). 
 76. See Gershoff & Grogan-Kaylor, supra note 20 (meta-analysis of over 100 studies 
on corporal punishment). 
 77. See American Academy of Pediatrics Committee on Psychosocial Aspects of 
Child and Family Health, Guidance for Effective Discipline, 101 PEDIATRICS 723 (1998) 
(“Corporal punishment is of limited effectiveness and has potentially deleterious side 
effects. The American Academy of Pediatrics recommends that parents be encouraged 
and assisted in the development of methods other than spanking for managing undesired 
behavior.”). 
 78. Pollard, supra note 21, at 621. 
 79. Dorvil, 32 N.E.3d at 868. 
 80. See Gershoff & Bitensky, supra note 77. 
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beatings, inherited their oppressors’ violence and, for centuries, 
passed down these parenting beliefs.” Patton terms this pattern:  
one of the saddest untold stories in American history—the way 
in which the victims of racist oppression and violence have hurt 
the bodies of their own children in an effort to protect them 
from a hostile society. . .The truth is that white supremacy has 
done a masterful job of getting Black people to continue its 
trauma work and call it “love.”81 
Patton critiques the Black leaders who continue to support 
corporal punishment and bemoans the many Black parents who 
beat their children in the name of discipline and/or permit them 
to be “paddled” at school in the states that allow parents to make 
this choice. She calls for the Black community to stop using 
corporal punishment because it erodes children’s humanity and 
teaches them blind obedience. These are problematic for all 
communities, but particularly Black children, who need to learn 
to object to their victimization and resist violence, particularly 
racialized violence. 
The recognition of these harms has led to the banning of 
corporal punishment in most other settings, including prisons, day 
cares, and mental health facilities.82 The use of corporal 
punishment in schools has also been severely curtailed in recent 
decades. Until the 1980s, corporal punishment of students by 
teachers and administrators was legally permissible and routinely 
practiced nationwide. As of 2016, thirty-one states and the 
District of Columbia had banned corporal punishment in schools, 
largely driven by increased knowledge about both the harms of 
corporal punishment and the effectiveness of non-physical 
disciplinary methods.83 Several of the states still permitting it only 
 
 81. Patton, supra note 13. 
 82. See Letter from John B. King, Jr. to Governors and Chief State School Officers 
(Nov. 22, 2016), https://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/school-discipline/files/corporal-
punishment-dcl-11-22-2016.pdf (“Corporal punishment has also been banned in . . . U.S. 
prisons and U.S. military training facilities, and most juvenile detention facilities” and “[a] 
long list of education, medical, civil rights, disabilities, and child advocacy groups . . . have 
also been calling for a ban on this practice.”); see also Melinda D. Anderson, Where 
Teachers Are Still Allowed to Spank Students: Corporal Punishment is Legal in 19 States, 
THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2015/12/
corporalpunishment/420420. 
 83. State Laws, GUNDERSEN CENTER FOR EFFECTIVE DISCIPLINE (2017), 
http://www.gundersenhealth.org/ncptc/center-for-effective-discipline/discipline-and-the-
law/state-laws; Steve Hendrix, End of Spanking?, WASH. POST (Jan. 3, 2013) 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/magazine/the-end-of-spanking/2013/01/02/d328
cf1e-3273-11e2-bb9b-288a310849ee_story.html. 
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allow teacher corporal punishment if parents give written 
permission,84 and the vast majority of children “paddled” in 
schools live in just five states—Mississippi, Texas, Alabama, 
Arkansas, and Georgia.85 Citing extensive data on the harms of 
physical punishment, the Secretary of Education called for a 
nationwide ban on educational corporal punishment in December 
2016, and several jurisdictions are currently working towards this 
recommendation.86 
The data on its harms has also led to an international trend 
of banning parental corporal punishment. Sweden was the first 
country to do so in 1979, and recently France brought the total to 
52 worldwide.87 In doing so, these nations cited the psychological 
and expressive harms of permitting assault on society’s most 
vulnerable members, as well as international law equating 
corporal punishment with other physical assaults and torture.88 
*** 
In this Part, I have argued that the broad scope of the 
parental discipline privilege is unsupported by the offered 
rationales of personal experience and outdated tradition. In the 
next Part, I lay out a fuller argument for abolishing the parental 
discipline privilege, contending that its persistence in the face of 
its documented harms reflects both a criminal law anomaly and 
an overreading of parental rights. 
 
 84. Ohio, Utah, Texas, and North Carolina all allow parents to place their children 
on a “no-paddle list.” See Anderson, supra note 82. 
 85. See Anderson, supra note 82. 
 86. See Letter from King, supra note 82. 
 87. See Constance Gibbs, France Says ‘Non!’ to Hitting Kids as It Bans Corporal 
Punishment, NY DAILY NEWS (Jan. 4, 2017, 10:40 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/life-
style/france-hitting-kids-bans-corporal-punishment-article-1.2934219 (detailing that 52 
countries worldwide have now banned corporal punishment, including most of 
Europe); see also CNN, Corporal Punishment Policies Around the World, CNN.COM (Nov. 
9, 2011, 4:05 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/asiapcf/11/08/country.comparisons.
corporal.punishment/ (“Sweden, in 1979, was the first to make it illegal to strike a child as 
a form of discipline. Since then, many other countries in Europe have also instituted bans, 
as have New Zealand and some countries in Africa and the Americas.”).  
 88. See United Nations, Convention on the Rights of the Child, Res. 44/25, Art. 
37(a) (Nov. 20 1989), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/crc.pdf (“No 
child shall be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.”). 
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III.  BANNING PARENTAL CORPORAL PUNISHMENT 
I argue in this Part that the parental discipline privilege 
should be abolished. Constitutional norms are not a bar, and 
instead militate towards, this change. The malleable and more 
limited nature of parental rights, the empirical evidence of harm 
from corporal punishment, and an evolving consensus about 
appropriate childrearing conduct, all support abolition. 
Parental rights, as noted above, are flexible and must take 
into account the interests of both the state and children. A 
primary rationale for them is that parents are in the best position 
to care for and raise children.89 Because of this, parental rights are 
intertwined with duties.90 Incorporating this vision of 
constitutional parenthood as a double-sided coin, scholars have 
posited parents as fiduciaries or trustees of their children, rather 
than owners or masters.91 In this framework, parents have no right 
to “control” their children; instead they have an obligation to 
nurture and raise them to be the best future citizens.92 When 
parents make choices that “compromise children’s developmental 
needs or the stability . . . of the polity, the state may justly 
intervene.”93 
The doctrinal requirement that adults exercise corporal 
punishment for the child’s welfare, or with a reasonable belief that 
it is necessary or appropriate, reflects this presumption. The 
growing consensus by medical professionals and research 
documenting the harmful effects of corporal punishment, 
however, demonstrate that it can no longer be justified in a child’s 
 
 89. See supra notes 27–29. 
 90. Prior to Troxel, in Lehr v. Robertson the Supreme Court noted that parental 
rights are “the counterpart of the responsibilities [parents] have assumed.” 463 U.S. 248, 
257 (1983). 
 91. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. 
REV. 2401 (1995). Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered 
Perspective on Parent’s Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1746 (1993) (outlining a “generist” 
framework wherein parents are tasked with nurturing children, as trustees rather than 
owners). Shulman’s reading of the constitutional and family law doctrine provides 
historical support for this conception of parent as trustee. See SHULMAN, supra note 32, at 
166–67. Consistent with this vision is a developmentally-based model of parental rights put 
forward by, among others, philosopher Shelley Burtt. See Shelley Burtt, The Proper Scope 
of Parental Authority: Why We Don’t Owe Children an “Open Future,” 44 CHILD, FAM. & 
ST. 243 (2003). 
 92. Burtt, supra note 91, at 260 (describing “the sorts of goods that children must 
receive to grow, at a minimum, into socially competent, civically responsible, financially 
resourceful adults”). 
 93. Id. at 259–60. 
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interest. Put another way, it is no longer reasonable to believe that 
corporal punishment is truly for a child’s welfare.94 Stripped of this 
assumption, the real reasons behind much parental violence 
towards children are revealed—frustration and anger, perhaps 
coupled with antiquated notions of children as property.95 These 
motivations against the child’s interests, coupled with corporal 
punishment’s documented harm, outweigh parental choice and 
any historic or personal rationales for this archaic exculpation. 
Like intimate partner violence, relational status should no longer 
exculpate anyone from assault. 
New empirical evidence and evolving societal and 
international consensus have led to changing treatment of 
juveniles and the curtailment of parental rights in numerous other 
contexts. For instance, in the last decade, the Supreme Court has 
greatly limited the punishment of juveniles who have committed 
crimes. In prohibiting the death penalty, life without parole for 
non-homicide crimes, and automatic life without parole 
sentences, the Court relied heavily both on neurological evidence 
about brain development as well as changing international 
norms.96 
Specifically as to the parent-child relationship, courts and 
legislatures have limited parental choice in the two key areas of 
education97 and medical treatment.98 One recent example is 
 
 94. C.f. Jennifer M. Collins, Crime and Parenthood: The Uneasy Case for Prosecuting 
Negligent Parents, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 807, 812 (2006) (arguing for more consistent and 
stringent prosecution of parents who negligently kill their children both because parents 
do not always act in their children’s interests, and to reflect that parental rights also 
implicate duties of care); see also Jennifer M. Collins, Lady Madonna, Children at Your 
Feet: The Criminal Justice System’s Romanticization of the Parent-Child Relationship, 93 
IOWA L. REV. 131, 133-34 (2007) (arguing that the incidence of child abuse shows us that 
this is not always true, and that the law is too trusting in parental love). 
 95. See Straus, supra note 10. As to notions of children as property, see Woodhouse, 
Who Owns the Child, supra note 31. 
 96. As to the first, see Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (citing “scientific 
and sociological studies” to confirm “a lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of 
responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults and are more understandable 
among the young”). For the Court’s reliance on changing international norms for its 
changed approach to the punishment of juveniles, see id. at 576 (citing the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child and “the overwhelming weight of international 
opinion against the juvenile death penalty” to “provide respected and significant 
confirmation for [its] own conclusions.”). 
 97. See N.Y. EDU. LAW §§ 3204(2) & 3210(2)(d) (limiting and regulating 
homeschooling). 
 98. See, e.g., In re Sampson, 278 N.E.2d at 919; In re Hofbauer, 393 N.E.2d 1009 (N.Y. 
Ct. App. 1979). 
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mandatory vaccinations. In 2016, California enacted legislation 
eliminating all exemptions.99 Scholars have persuasively argued 
that this mandate is constitutionally permissible, despite parental 
and religious objections, given the proven evidence of harm from 
non-vaccinating.100 Indeed, Erwin Chemerinsky and Michelle 
Goodwin contend that children’s uniquely vulnerable status make 
parental harms particularly problematic and subject to state 
regulation.101 
Changed norms and, most importantly, scientific insights 
have led to these major shifts in the law governing juveniles. Like 
the rationales for curbing the punishment of minors, there is clear 
social science consensus about the harms of corporal punishment. 
Its abolition in other settings outside of the home, and even in 
certain kinds of homes such as foster homes, demonstrate this.102 
Similarly to non-vaccination, the widespread societal 
consequences of parental corporal punishment can be seen as a 
public health concern. The personhood injuries described above 
compound the empirically proven harms of corporal punishment, 
particularly for children already marginalized by race. Further 
supporting a ban is the growing international consensus that 
assault against children should not be condoned, even when, or 
maybe particularly when, committed by parents. The line of abuse 
has moved, and now includes beating and hitting that was 
permitted during earlier times.103 Accordingly, we can no longer 
exculpate in the name of children’s best interests. 
 
 99. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120335(b) (effective as of Jan. 1, 2016) (West 
Supp. 2017) (“The governing authority shall not unconditionally admit any person as a 
pupil of any private or public elementary or secondary school, child care center, day 
nursery, nursery school, family day care home, or development center, unless, prior to his 
or her first admission to that institution, he or she has been fully immunized.”). 
 100. See Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin, Compulsory Vaccination Laws Are 
Constitutional, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 589, 594, 603-05 (2016) (arguing that a compulsory 
vaccination law can withstand challenges based on parental rights and religious beliefs, and 
describing courts’ consistent rejection of constitutional challenges to compulsory 
vaccination laws). 
 101. See Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin, Religion Is Not a Basis for Harming 
Others: Review Essay of Paul A. Offit’s Bad Faith: When Religious Belief Undermines 
Modern Medicine, 104 GEO. L.J. 1111, 1128–31 (2016) (arguing against parents’ ability to 
deny children medical care on the basis of their religious, or other philosophical, beliefs). 
 102. See supra notes 82-86, 49 (discussing the abolition of corporal punishment in 
daycares, schools, etc. and the Magazu case). 
 103. There are no other remaining exceptions to criminal liability. In Blackstone’s 
time, for instance, the discipline of wives, apprentices and students also constituted 
exceptions to assault and battery laws. See, e.g., 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
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A word on privacy. Family privacy, as noted above, is 
intertwined with parental rights and other family constitutional 
rights.104 Whether the corporal punishment occurs in a public or 
private place also appears to influence judicial determinations of 
its legitimacy. For instance, the court in Sweaney noted that the 
mother hit her child at school in front of teachers.105 The father in 
Dorvil spanked his child on the street, witnessed by two police 
officers. Yet the public nature of the discipline did not just make 
it more likely to be prosecuted.106 Instead, courts seem to consider 
it part of the analysis distinguishing between acceptable parental 
discipline and criminal assault. Tellingly, the trial court judge 
explicitly noted the public nature of Dorvil’s corporal punishment 
in finding him guilty, declaring “[i]f you’re in public with your 
kids, it’s not appropriate to discipline in this fashion.”107 This 
statement problematically implies that harm perpetuated in the 
home is beyond the scope of state intervention.108 
Assaults on children should be seen as a public problem, no 
matter the location.109 Feminist scholars have presented a robust 
critique of privacy as cover for intrafamilial harms and the 
perpetuation of illegitimate hierarchies.110 They have persuasively 
demonstrated that the private/public line is malleable and subject 
 
COMMENTARIES *120. All of these have since been abolished. See Godsoe, Relational 
Crime, supra note 22. 
 104. See supra note 27. 
 105. See Sweaney, 119 F.3d at 1387. 
 106. Presumably public assaults, particularly in front of mandated reporters, are also 
more likely to result in prosecution. 
 107. Commonwealth v. Dorvil, 32 N.E.3d 861, 865–66 (Mass. 2015) (emphasis added) 
(quoting trial court transcript at 99–100, which contains the remarks at sentencing by Julie 
J. Bernard, J.). The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reversed the Appeals Court 
of Massachusetts, which had affirmed the trial court's decision. See Dorvil, 32 N.E.3d at 
872 (reasoning that “[i]t is understandable that parents would be angry at a child whose 
misbehavior necessitates punishment, and we see no reason why such anger should render 
otherwise reasonable uses of force impermissible”). 
 108. Cf. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs, 489 U.S. 189 (1989) and 
critique by Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A Thirteenth 
Amendment Response to DeShaney, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1992) (arguing that treating 
children like parental property is unconstitutional). 
 109. See Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language, 
and Family Violence, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1665 (1990). 
 110. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and 
Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2118 (1996) (demonstrating how “protect[ion of] the privacy 
of the family and promot[ion of] ‘domestic harmony’” served to immunize men who beat 
their wives from criminal sanctions); see also Schneider, supra note 18, at 976, 979 (arguing 
that although “[t]he law claims to be absent in the private sphere[,]” it is very much present 
in defining the family and instituting a hierarchy of “male [and adult] dominance”). 
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to manipulation, protecting only certain types of families or 
particular persons within families, usually not women and 
children.111 As Frances Olson put it, “all private action can be 
made to look public and vice versa.”112 Characterizing something 
as private legitimizes it and precludes state intervention that 
would limit power imbalances and harm.113 In the intimate partner 
violence context, however, privacy is no longer an acceptable 
justification for assault. Similarly, whether the child is in the home 
or in a public place should not determine the legitimacy of 
corporal punishment. 
This is not to say that privacy is an unadulterated harm; 
indeed, state intervention to regulate parental corporal 
punishment is fraught with risks of disproportionality and the 
policing of parenthood choices that should be protected.114 This is 
particularly true of low-income women of color, who are over- 
regulated and punished in both the child welfare and criminal 
systems.115 These concerns, however, already exist since currently 
we distinguish between justified parental corporal punishment 
and unreasonable corporal punishment to mitigate them further; 
moreover, privacy could be reenvisioned in an egalitarian fashion, 
to protect all families against unwarranted state intrusion, while 
simultaneously shielding all family members against intrafamilial 
abuse.116 Consistent with this reimagined family privacy are 
 
 111. See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 18, at 978 (“Definitions of ‘private’ and ‘public’ in 
any particular legal context can and do constantly shift.”). As to privacy’s strategic use 
against more marginalized families, see Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who 
Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 
1470 (1991) (noting “the contradictory meaning of the private sphere for women of color” 
in describing their disproportionate punishment for actions during pregnancy); Kaaryn 
Gustafson, Degradation Ceremonies and the Criminalization of Low-Income Women, 3 
U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 297 (2013); see also Khiara M. Bridges, Privacy Rights and Public 
Families, 34 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 113, 116 (2011) (detailing ethnographic research from 
an obstetrics clinic demonstrating “gross and substantial intrusion by the government into 
poor, pregnant women’s private lives”). 
 112. Frances Olson, Constitutional Law: Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private 
Distinction, 10 CONST. COMM. 319, 322 (1993). 
 113. Id. at 321 (including child abuse in the protected harmful conduct). 
 114. I further elaborate and address these concerns elsewhere. See Godsoe, Relational 
Crime, supra note 22. 
 115. For a thoughtful analysis of this problem, see Dorothy E. Roberts, Prison, Foster 
Care, and the Systemic Punishment of Black Mothers, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1474 (2012). 
 116. See, e.g., Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723, 745 
(1999) (imagining an “egalitarian privacy” framework which would protect all family 
members, a scheme under which both domestic violence “and parents batter[ing] their 
children” would be “no longer acceptable”); see also Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts, 
supra note 111, at 1465 (positing a right of privacy which “seeks to protect intimate or 
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theories of parental rights as developmentally-based, and of 
parents as trustees rather than owners or masters.117 
CONCLUSION 
I have argued here for the abolition of the parental 
disciplinary privilege—a proposal that should not be radical, but 
nonetheless is. There is widespread medical consensus that the 
practice is ineffective, and often harmful. This scientific reality 
negates the presumption of aligned parental and children’s 
interests. Corporal punishment is often driven by parental 
frustration, anger, or tradition; criminal assault and battery should 
not fall within permissible child rearing methods. And yet, 
because we largely ignore the treatment of children and overread 
parental rights, widespread corporal punishment persists. 
Although this Article addresses just one, albeit widespread, 
harmful parenting practice, it has broader implications. This 
analysis militates towards a narrower and more context-specific 
reading of parental rights. As such, it supports revisiting other 
parenting practices as we gain new empirical evidence and as 
societal norms shift. Should parents be permitted to send their 
children to unregulated “boot camps” with spotty safety 
records?118 Require them to participate in religious activities that 
promulgate racist or sexist hierarchies?119 Deny adolescents 
mental health treatment because of personal disdain for 
psychiatry or,120 conversely, force them to undergo ‘conversion 
 
personal affairs [of all types of families] that are fundamental to an individual’s identity 
and moral personhood from unjustified government intrusion”). 
 117. See supra notes 90–93 (describing the theoretical model). 
 118. See Cynthia Godsoe, All in the Family: Towards a New Representational Model 
for Parents and Children, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 303 (2011). 
 119. See, e.g., The Remarkable Journey of Orthodox Jewish Woman Cast Out Into A 
Life of Poverty by Her Family After Buying a Tight Sweater at 17…Who Then Went on to 
Graduate Harvard, DAILY MAIL (Jan. 26, 2014), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
2546290/Orthodox-Jewish-woman-shunned-family-age-17-graduates-Harvard.html 
(discussing the case of Leah Vincent); see also Leo Hohmann, Islam Quiz Has U.S. Parents 
Outraged, WND.COM (Sept. 29, 2015, 8:01 PM) (describing how teaching some basic facts 
about Islam in a Georgia public school led thousands of parents and “concerned citizens” 
to protest and petition for curricular change). Parents objected that only they should be 
teaching children about religion, and that learning about Islam “goes against [their] 
religion [Christianity] completely.” The teachers responded that they were merely trying 
to teach children that the religions and communities were “equal.” Id. 
 120. See Judith Warner, The Denial of Mental Illness is Alive and Well, TIME (Sept. 
14, 2012) (discussing one such case); see also Jennifer O’Neill, Parents ‘In Denial’ About 
Teen’s Depression and Anxiety, YAHOO PARENTING (April 29, 2015), 
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therapy’ if they are gay, transgender or gender non-
conforming?121 These and a range of other questions merit the 
attention of family law scholars and reformers in order to ensure 
the best balance between parental choice and children’s safety 





 121. All but a handful of states still permit parents to mandate this therapy, which has 
resulted in trauma and, in some cases, suicide. See Julie Laemmle, California’s Conversion: 
A Ban on Minor Conversion Therapy and the Effect on Other States, 2 IND. J.L. & SOC. 
EQUALITY 248 (2013); Jody L. Herman, Parents of Transgender Children Need to Look at 
the Research, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2015) (discussing the Leelah Alcorn case), 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/01/08/is-it-child-abuse-to-make-a-trans-child-
change/parents-of-transgender-children-need-to-look-at-the-research. Some commentators 
have criticized bans on conversion therapy for infringing on parental rights. See, e.g., Lynn 
Wardle, Anti-Gay Conversion Therapy Laws Infringe Parental Rights, CNS NEWS (Aug. 
14, 2015, 3:52 PM), http://www.cnsnews.com/commentary/lynn-wardle/anti-gay-
conversion-therapy-laws-infringe-parental-rights (“The anti-SOCE laws also appear to 
seriously infringe parental rights, which long have long been deemed protected as 
fundamental rights under the Constitution of the United States . . . . Perhaps the most 
disturbing aspect of the anti-SOCE laws is their disregard for and denial of parental rights 
to act in the best interests of their own children. That strikes a blow that harms not only 
the parents who support SOCE treatment for their children, but ALL parents and children 
. . . . The pursuit of political correctness is no justification for interference with the 
constitutional rights of parents.”). 
